In May 2011 John W Henry’s Fenway Sports Group purchased Liverpool Football Club. He was spotted stepping off the plane with a copy of Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski’s Soccernomics. The book is a cousin of Michael Lewis’ Moneyball.
Moneyball follows the Oakland Athletics a small baseball franchise whose annual budget was dwarfed by those of the established giants, the New York Yankees, Chicage White Sox, St Louis Cardinals and many more. Yet despite their small resources thr Oakland As were able to consistently make the play-offs and even put together an American League record of 20 straight wins in 2002. Everyone wondered just how they and coach Billy Beane were able to do it.
What they did was change how they scouted. First deciding that with such a small wage budget they had to get full value from every player. They then decided that trusting their eyes was bad idea. They decided they needed to trust the statistic sheets. They had to decide which statistics to trust.
In 1977 Bill James started his Baseball Abstract. The book could be comparable to Wisden. A comprehensive summary of statistics. Yet it was more than that. Bill James decided that the statistical analysis used was wrong. He created his own statistical categories.
It was from these categories that the Oakland As scouted. Finding niches that other ball clubs had not considered at that point. Through this they were able to gain an edge on the other teams.
When John W Henry bought Liverpool this was his idea this was his idea. To use statistical analysis in order to get the most out of all signings. Even to develop a style of play that would help this. The statistics told Damien Comolli that the players who had created the most goalscoring opportunities were Stewart Downing and Jordan Henderson. That they had created these chances by crossing the ball from wide areas. They needed someone to convert these chances. Andy Carroll.
The decision makers at Anfield felt they had come up with something new. Something that would provide success. They found their undervalued market and were set to exploit it. Signing young talents who could be resold for profit and fitted the statistical ethos.
They were wrong.
There was nothing new in what they were doing. Indeed statistical analysis had driven the FA for many years. Charles Hughes was FA director of coaching for many years. His philosophy grew from analysing matches and the most telling statistic for him was that of how many passes, on average, it took to create a goalscoring chance and where the goals where scored from. POMO. Position Of Maximum Opportunity. The analysis found that set plays and crosses were the key.
Fast forward to the Premier League era and a small Lancastrian football club with a manager who swore by statistics. In the early 2000s Sam Allardyce took Bolton Wanderers into the Premier League. The budget was small and remained that way. Yet Allardyce kept Bolton in the top division. Until he left. Not long after they were relegated.
While Allardyce was at Bolton they consistently improved their final league position with each season until reaching an apex of sixth place in 2005. That season Bolton garnered 58 points, the same as Liverpool. Liverpool would end the season as winners of the Champions League.
Bolton’s playing style shared many similarities with John Charles’ POMO and the early Moneyball formula used by Liverpool. A steady stream of crosses into the opposition area yielding results. It did not matter what the eyes saw, only what the scoreboard and league table read.
Allardyce found his own undervalued market. Experienced international footballers, apparently unwanted by their clubs. The four most significant signings –
Jay Jay Okocha. Free. Aged 29.
Youri Djorkaeff. Free. Aged 34.
Gary Speed. £750,000. Aged 35.
Ivan Campo. Initially a loan. Permanently for around £2million.
These players had won league titles, European trophies and even a World Cup.
Finding an edge is nothing new in football. Trying to steal a proverbial march on your rivals.
The man who arguably stole the biggest march was Arsene Wenger. Not through the use of statistics but through knowledge that was previously untapped in England.
Famously when he was appointed in 1996 the newspapers asked Arsene Who? They certainly knew who he was when Arsenal won the double a couple of seasons later. He transformed the players at the club by instilling nutritional regimes (cutting out alcohol), investing in training facilities and working with each player on technique. It is crude and cruel to say that his emphasis on technique was uncommon in England, but to a large extent it was. A European, possession based style was not to the fore at the time, thus providing another edge.
The biggest edge came in the transfer market. Initially through his knowledge of French football. Wenger found his undervalued market for his earliest signings. That knowledge would continue to serve him. Some of these signings represent tremendous value for money.
Patrick Viera. £3.5 million.
Nicolas Anelka. Under £1million.
Emmanuel Petit. £3.5million.
Kolo Toure. Under £1million.
Gael Clichy. Under £1million.
Emmanuel Adebayor. £3million.
The final French signing to note is the most expensive but also the most significant.
Thierry Henry. £11million.
Henry would leave as Arsenal’s highest scorer. He would also leave for a huge profit. All of the players listed above would leave for far more than Arsene paid.
It was not just the French players that would provide an edge. Wenger realised that it was better to spend money on a global scouting network than to overspend on transfer fees. This network would unearth further value for money.
Freddie Ljungberg. £3million.
Robin Van Persie. £3million.
Cesc Fabregas. Under £1million.
Arsenal were for many seasons Manchester United’s only real challengers, until the huge overseas money arrived at Chelsea and Manchester City. Manchester Unirted always had a much bigger budget yet Arsenal were able to compete through the edge that their transfer policy provided.
In 2002 the Boston Red Sox made Billy Beane an offer to become their General Manager. The Red Sox had a new owner, John W Henry. Henry had made his money trading commodities, using the statistics and sheets to his advantage. Clearly someone like Billy Beane would appeal to him. Beane turned down Henry’s offer.
Unable to bring in Beane, Henry turned to Bill James. Not as General Manager but as Senior Advisor, Baseball Operations. Suddenly a team with the same ideas that had provided success for the Oakland As was in the market. Except they had a bigger budget. In 2004 the Red Sox won the World Series. Worse for The Oakland As the Red Sox were not the only ones to take this approach. The rest had caught up.
Billy Beane had to find a new undervalued market. He went against his original principles and sign college players. The Moneyball approach had turned the market on it’s head. What was once overvalued became undervalued, but Oakland were not as successful.
Arsene Wenger and Arsenal have suffered from something similar. Other clubs started to use their principles. Diets. Facilities. Global scouting networks.Managers with knowledge of specific nations. All with bigger budgets. The number of competitors also increased. Instead of competing with one club, Wenger is now competing against 5 or 6. The edge has now gone and Arsenal are forced to spend big money on players, like Mezut Ozil.
The original Moneyball factor is seemingly lost for Arsene Wenger. Billy Beane and the Oakland As have rediscovered some of their success by reaching the play offs in the last two seasons. They eventually found their new market by placing emphasis on defensive efficiency. Can Arsene Wenger find himself a new edge and return trophies to Arsenal?
http://www.theworks.co.uk/p/football/soccernomics/9780007457847?CAWELAID=1817488595&cagpspn=pla&gclid=CJ_GutWX3rwCFWLHtAod-TkAzw
http://static.espn.go.com/mlb/s/2002/1105/1456563.html